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1Abstract
In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a ¯nished
good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI in°ation rates, a benev-
olent central bank faces a tradeo® between stabilizing the two measures of in°ation: a ¯nal
output gap, and unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so
that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy
with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when
the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main
¯nding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI
in°ation and PPI in°ation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules
that ignore PPI in°ation or PPI sector shocks can result in signi¯cant welfare losses.
JEL classi¯cation: E31, E32, E52
Keywords: In°ation targeting; CPI; PPI; Optimal monetary policy; Implementation; Welfare
21 Introduction
Stabilizing the variability in in°ation and the output gap has been an important goal for many
central banks around the world. It has also been viewed as the objective of a central bank in
most studies of optimal monetary policy rules. In both policy practice and academic research,
the in°ation target, either explicit or implicit, is almost uniformly measured by the cost of living
index, the CPI, even though the cost of production index, the PPI, is also readily observable
and the cyclical behaviors of the two measures of in°ation are quite di®erent. Table 1 presents
evidence that most countries that have adopted an explicit in°ation-targeting policy have been
targeting CPI in°ation or its variants (see also the comprehensive survey in Bernanke, et al.
(1999)), despite the fact that the cyclical behavior of the PPI in°ation rate in general di®ers
from the CPI in°ation rate in that it is typically more volatile and less persistent (e.g., Clark
(1999));1 and that, as we show in an in°ation-accounting exercise below (Section 8), nominal
rigidities in both the CPI sector and the PPI sector play an important role in explaining the
dynamic relations between CPI, PPI, and wage in°ation observed in the U.S. data.
In the context of the \New Keynesian Synthesis," many authors have argued that, by stabi-
lizing °uctuations in CPI in°ation, the central bank could e®ectively stabilize the variability of
the output gap that measures the deviation of actual output from its natural rate level. If the
natural rate is close to being optimal, the argument goes, such a policy would then be welfare
improving and hence desirable.2 The reasoning behind such arguments is typically based on a
dynamic general equilibrium model with some sources of nominal rigidity and is thus built on
microeconomic foundations. The basic model is °exible enough to allow for several sources of
nominal rigidities in the form of sticky prices in multiple sectors [e.g., Mankiw and Reis (2002)]
or in multiple countries [e.g., Benigno (forthcoming) and Clarida, et al. (2002)], or in the form
of sticky prices and sticky nominal wages [e.g., Erceg, et al. (2000) and Amato and Laubach
(2003)]. An important insight from these studies is that, in the presence of multiple sources of
nominal rigidities, complete stability of CPI in°ation does not always lead to stability of the
output gap because of a tradeo® between stabilizing the output gap and relative price gaps.
In a recent survey of this literature, Woodford (2003a, Chapter 6) notes that \the question
of which price index it is most desirable to stabilize remains an important topic for further
study."
1One possible reason why CPI is less volatile than PPI is that the central bank has been targeting CPI.
But this pattern holds even for the period in the mid 1930s [see Means (1935)], casting doubt on the role of
monetary policy in shaping the cyclical behaviors of CPI and PPI.
2See, for example, Clarida, et al. (1999), Goodfriend and King (2001), and Woodford (2003a), among others.
3In the spirit of this strand of literature, our paper analyzes the design and implementation
of optimal monetary policy in a DSGE model with multiple sources of nominal rigidities and
therefore multiple price indices for the monetary authority to consider stabilizing. As a key
point of departure from the literature, however, our model features an input-output linkage
between sectors that is supported by empirical evidence yet remarkably overlooked in the
literature.3
In the model, ¯nal consumption goods are produced through two stages of processing. At
each stage of processing, there is a continuum of ¯rms producing di®erentiated goods. The
prices of both intermediate production inputs and ¯nal consumption goods are determined by
staggered nominal contracts. The price index of the intermediate goods corresponds broadly
to the PPI, while that of the ¯nished goods corresponds to the CPI. We derive the objective
function of a benevolent central bank from the ¯rst principle, and, under this objective, we
characterize optimal monetary policy and compare the welfare implications of several simple
interest-rate rules.
Our analytical results reveal that, along with variations in CPI in°ation and the output
gap, the central bank should also care about variations in PPI in°ation and the gap of the
real marginal cost in the production of intermediate goods. Variation in the real marginal cost
gap enters the benevolent CB's loss function as a separate term, which cannot possibly be
rewritten as a combination of the other three terms in the loss function because °uctuations in
the relative price of intermediate goods to ¯nal goods have an allocative role. This stands in
contrast to the two-sector model of Aoki (2001) featuring a single source of nominal rigidity,
so that °uctuations in the sectoral relative price have no allocative role, and the ¯rst-best
allocation can be achieved. Here, to achieve Pareto optimal allocations would require not only
complete stabilization of the output gap and CPI in°ation rate but also complete stabilization
of the PPI in°ation rate and the marginal-cost gap and, thus, of the relative-price gap. We
show that it is impossible for monetary policy to attain the Pareto optimal allocation except
in the special cases where the two sectors are bu®eted by identical productivity shocks, or the
prices of intermediate goods or ¯nished goods are °exible, or the processing of ¯nished goods
does not require the use of primary factors. In the latter two cases, °uctuations in the sectoral
relative price have no allocative role. In general, the central bank faces tradeo®s in stabilizing
the four components in its optimally derived objective function: the output gap, CPI in°ation,
PPI in°ation, and the marginal-cost gap.
3For a DSGE model with multiple stages of processing and the implications of the input-output connections
on monetary policy transmission, see Huang and Liu (2001) and the references therein.
4Since the ¯rst-best allocation is in general not attainable, the optimality of a monetary
policy depends on the relative weights assigned to the four components that the central bank
should care about in its objective function. In contrast, in a standard one-sector model with
staggered price setting, the weights assigned to the components in policymakers' objective
functions are irrelevant for the determination of optimal monetary policy. In such a one-sector
model, the central bank faces no tradeo®s in stabilizing the output gap and CPI in°ation, since
keeping constant the CPI in°ation rate would also eliminate variations in the output gap. In
fact, the ¯rst-best welfare levels are obtainable in this class of models under a remarkably
simple policy of extreme CPI in°ation targeting (e.g., Goodfriend and King (2001)).4
The weights assigned to the output gap and CPI in°ation in a policymaker's objective
function in our current model are similar to those in a standard one-sector model. The weights
assigned to PPI in°ation and the marginal-cost gap depend on the share of intermediate goods
used in the processing of ¯nished goods. Denote the share by Á. The weight on PPI in°ation
is increasing in Á, while the weight on the marginal-cost gap is a concave function of Á and
achieves its maximum at Á = 0:5. Therefore, a greater value of Á leads to a bigger concern by
the central bank about the variability in PPI in°ation, while a moderate value of Á gives rise
to its most concern about the variation in the marginal cost.
This role played by Á in shaping the policymaker's objective function is a unique feature
of our model with a vertical input-output structure. If Á is smaller than 0:5, intermediate
production inputs become less important in the processing of ¯nal consumption goods, and
thus the central bank should be less concerned with variations in both PPI in°ation and
the marginal cost faced by intermediate good producers. If Á is greater than 0:5, intermediate
inputs become more important, and the central bank should be more concerned with variations
in PPI in°ation. However, as PPI in°ation receives more direct attention, less attention needs
to be paid to the marginal cost gap, since variations in the former are attributable in part to
variations in the latter. This implication of the input-output structure on the central bank's
objective function has signi¯cant consequences for the determination of optimal monetary
policy.
4Woodford (2003a) presents a few examples where optimal monetary policy faces a tradeo® between stabi-
lizing the in°ation rate and the output gap, even if there is a single source of nominal rigidity. The examples
include introducing exogenous cost-push shocks or imposing conditions that prevent the nominal interest rate
from hitting the zero lower bound. As we will make clear below, in our model, a \cost-push" term arises
endogenously from the input-output connections, a unique feature of our model.
5Optimal monetary policy using the short nominal interest rate as an instrument is char-
acterized by a very complicated rule. To implement optimal monetary policy using such a
rule requires the central bank to possess perfect information about the leads and lags of the
in°ation rates and the gaps. A daunting task! Nevertheless, the welfare level under optimal
monetary policy provides a natural benchmark that can be used to evaluate the performance
of alternative interest-rate rules that are easily implementable using the information set of the
policymaker. We examine various such simple rules. We ¯nd that a hybrid in°ation-targeting
rule that sets the short nominal interest rate to respond to variations in both CPI in°ation and
PPI in°ation induces a welfare level that is very close to the second best (i.e., to that under
optimal monetary policy). The incorporation of the output gap as an additional targeting vari-
able does not produce marked changes in the level of welfare. In contrast, an optimal Taylor
rule, which targets variations in CPI in°ation and the output gap, can result in substantial
welfare losses compared to the second best. In general, a policy rule that ignores PPI in°ation
tends to generate greater welfare losses than a hybrid rule that targets an \in°ation index"
that includes both CPI and PPI in°ation. In the policy reaction function under the hybrid
in°ation-targeting rule, the relative weights assigned to the CPI and PPI in°ation rates depend
on the intermediate-input share Á, along with other structural parameter values. Under plau-
sible parameter values, the relative weight assigned to PPI in°ation in the optimal in°ation
index lies between 0:4 and 0:5.
By constructing the model with two stages of processing, we are also able to analyze the
sensitivity of the welfare losses when the central bank's perceived sources of shocks or of
nominal rigidities may di®er from the actual sources. To do this, we maintain that both CPI
and PPI are sticky in the baseline model. We ¯nd that, when the central bank does not know
the actual source of shocks, one way to avoid big welfare losses is to assume that the shocks hit
both sectors or just the PPI sector and to formulate an optimal interest rate rule that targets
the in°ation index under such an assumption. In other words, the loss would be small even
if such an assumption was wrong. In contrast, the potential welfare loss would be large if the
central bank formulates its policy based on the belief that the shock hits just the CPI sector,
and the belief turns out to be wrong. We also ¯nd that if monetary policy is formulated based
on the assumption that only one sector has sticky prices (either the CPI sector or the PPI
sector) while the truth is that stickiness lies in both sectors, the potential welfare losses are
large regardless of the source of shocks.
6The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 describes
equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 characterizes optimal monetary policy and derives a utility-
based objective function for a benevolent central bank. Section 5 discusses implementation
of the optimal policy, and Section 6 examines the potential welfare losses when the central
bank's perceived sources of shocks or of nominal rigidities may di®er from the actual sources.
Section 7 considers alternative policy objectives. Section 8 presents evidence that supports the
baseline model based on an in°ation accounting exercise. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
In the model economy, there is a large number of identical and in¯nitely lived households. The
representative household is endowed with one unit of time and derives utility from consumption
and leisure. The production of consumption goods goes through two stages of processing, from
intermediate goods to ¯nished goods. At each processing stage, there is a large number of
¯rms producing di®erentiated products. The production of intermediate goods requires labor
as the only input, while the production of ¯nished goods requires both labor and a composite
of intermediate goods as inputs. The ¯nal consumption good is a composite of di®erentiated
¯nished goods.
2.1 The Household




¯t[U(Ct) ¡ V (Nt)]; (1)
where E is an expectations operator, ¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, and Ct and Nt
are consumption and labor hours, respectively. In each period t, the household faces a budget
constraint
¹ PftCt + EtDt;t+1Bt+1 · WtNt + ¦t + Bt ¡ Tt; (2)
where Bt+1 denotes the holdings of a one-period state-contingent nominal bond that matures
in period t + 1 with a payo® of one unit of currency in the appropriate event, Dt;t+1 is the
period-t cost of such bonds, Wt is the nominal wage rate, ¦t is a claim to all ¯rms' pro¯ts, and











7where Yft(j) denotes the output of ¯nished good j and µf > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between the di®erentiated ¯nished goods. Solving the household's expenditure-minimization
















Solving the household's utility-maximization problem results in a labor supply equation













where Uct is the marginal utility of consumption, and Vnt is the marginal disutility of working.
Let Rt = [EtDt;t+1]¡1 denote the nominal return on a risk-free bond (i.e., the nominal interest








2.2 Firms and Optimal Price-Setting
To produce a type j ¯nished good requires inputs of labor and a composite of intermediate
goods, with a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology given by
Yft(j) = ¹ Ymt(j)Á(AftNft(j))1¡Á; (9)






µm¡1 denotes the input of composite intermediate goods used
by j, Nf(j) is the input of homogeneous labor, µm > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
di®erentiated intermediate goods, and Aft is a productivity shock to the ¯nished good sector.
To produce a type i intermediate good requires labor as the only input, with a CRS
technology
Ymt(i) = AmtNmt(i); (10)
where Nmt(i) is the input of homogeneous labor and Amt is a productivity shock to the inter-
mediate good sector.
8The productivity shocks each follows a log-di®erence stationary process. In particular, we
assume that
ln(Ak;t+1=Ak;t) = ½k ln(Akt=Ak;t¡1) + "k;t+1; k 2 ff;mg; (11)
where "ft and "mt are mean-zero, iid normal processes that are mutually independent, with
¯nite variances given by ¾2
f and ¾2
m, respectively.
Firms are price-takers in the input markets and monopolistic competitors in the product
markets. Within each processing stage, ¯rms set prices in a staggered fashion in the spirit of
Calvo (1983). In particular, in period t, all ¯rms receive an iid random signal that determines
whether they can set a new price. The probabilities that ¯rms in the ¯nished good sector and
the intermediate good sector can adjust prices are 1 ¡ ®f and 1 ¡ ®m, respectively. Thus, by
the law of large numbers, a fraction 1¡®k of ¯rms in sector k 2 ff;mg can adjust prices while
the rest of the ¯rms have to stay put.
If a ¯nished good producer j can set a new price in period t, it chooses the new price Pft(j)





f Dt;¿[Pft(j)(1 + ¿f) ¡ Vf¿]Y d
f¿(j); (12)
where ¿f denotes a subsidy to ¯nished good producers, Vf¿ is the unit production cost, and
Y d
f¿(j) is the demand schedule for j0s output given by (4). A ¯rm has to solve a cost-
minimization problem, taking the input prices as given, regardless of whether it can adjust its
























1¡µm is the price index of intermediate goods, that is, the
producer price index (PPI), and the unit cost function is given by























where ¹f = µf=(µf ¡ 1) measures the markup. The optimal price is thus an e®ective markup
(adjusted for subsidy) over a weighted average of the marginal costs in the future periods
9during which the price is expected to remain in e®ect. Similarly, the optimal pricing decision















where ¹m = µm=(µm ¡ 1) is a markup, ¿m denotes a subsidy to intermediate good producers,
the demand function Y d
m¿(i) is given by (13), and the unit cost function is obtained from





The solution to the cost-minimization problem also yields the ¯rm's demand for labor. By









Given the demand for labor in the two sectors in (14) and (19), labor market clearing




The bond market clearing implies that Bt = 0 for all t. The markets for the composite goods
also clear in an equilibrium. Finally, the production subsidies are ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes







µm¡1 is the composite of all
intermediate goods.
Since our objective is to ¯nd an optimal monetary policy in this economy and to compare
the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules, we do not specify a particular
policy here. Under any given monetary policy, we can de¯ne an equilibrium in this economy.
An equilibrium consists of allocations Ct, Nt, Bt+1 for the representative household; allocations
Yft(j), ¹ Ymt(j), and Nft(j), and price Pft(j) for ¯nished good producer j 2 [0;1]; allocations
Ymt(i) and Nmt(i), and price Pmt(i) for intermediate good producer i 2 [0;1]; together with
prices Dt;t+1, ¹ Pft, ¹ Pmt, and wage Wt, that satisfy the following conditions: (i) taking the prices
and the wage as given, the household's allocations solve its utility maximizing problem; (ii)
taking the wage and all prices but its own as given, each ¯nished good producer's allocations
and price solve its pro¯t maximizing problem; (iii) taking the wage and all prices but its own
as given, each intermediate good producer's allocations and price solve its pro¯t maximiz-
ing problem; and (iv) markets for bonds, labor, and the composite goods produced at each
processing stage clear.
103 Equilibrium Dynamics
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which a ¯rm in each sector is identi¯ed by the time at
which it can set a new price. Thus, we can drop the individual indexes of ¯rms and denote Pft
the price optimally set by ¯nished good producers, Pmt the price optimally set by intermediate
good producers, and so on.
3.1 The Steady State
Since there is no trend-growth in productivity, a steady state in this economy obtains if Am =








In addition, symmetry implies that the pricing decision in each sector coincides with the sector's
price index. Using the expressions for the unit cost functions (15) and (18), we can obtain a
solution for the steady-state real wage, which, along with the household's optimal labor supply
decision (6), lead to
¡Vn(N)
Uc(C)
= (1 ¡ ©f)(1 ¡ ©m)Á~ Á¡1 ´ (1 ¡ ©)~ Á¡1; (22)
where 1 ¡ ©k ´ (1 + ¿k)=¹k for k 2 ff;mg, and it measures an ine±ciency wedge caused by
monopolistic competition and distortionary subsidies.
To solve for aggregate employment, we ¯rst use the labor demand equations (14) and (19),
and the steady state relations Yf(j) = Yf = ¹ C, to obtain
Nm = Á~ Á(1 ¡ ©m)1¡ÁC; Nf = (1 ¡ Á)~ Á(1 ¡ ©m)¡ÁC: (23)
Aggregate employment is then obtained by summing up the labor demand of each sector:
N = Nm + Nf = ´C; (24)
where ´ ´ ~ Á(1 ¡ Á©m)=(1 ¡ ©m)Á.
Finally, we obtain solutions for steady state consumption and employment using (22) and
(24).
3.2 The Flexible-Price Equilibrium and the Natural Rate
With °exible prices, the pricing decisions are synchronized across ¯rms so that we can follow a
similar procedure as in solving the steady-state equilibrium to obtain solutions for the °exible-
price equilibrium. In particular, the optimal pricing rules (16) and (17) imply that the real
11marginal cost in each sector is a constant. This observation, along with the expressions for the












t denote the aggregate employment and consumption in the °exible-price
equilibrium, and the right-hand side is simply the solution for the real consumption wage.






























Thus, the sectoral employments are proportional to aggregate employment.
Next, we combine the optimal pricing equation and the unit cost function in the ¯nished













ft is the relative price of intermediate goods in units of consumption goods.
Given the solution for the relative price Q¤
t, along with the fact that the real marginal cost
V ¤
ft=P¤
ft is a constant (equal to 1 ¡ ©f), we can obtain a solution for the term V ¤
ft=P¤
mt in (27)
and thus express N¤












Finally, combining (25) and (29) gives the solutions for N¤
t and C¤
t .
A more explicit closed-form solution can be obtained when we log-linearize these equilibrium
conditions around the steady state. In particular, the log-linearized version of (25) is given by
!n¤
t + ¾c¤
t = Áamt + (1 ¡ Á)aft; (30)
where ! =
Vnn(N)N
Vn(N) and ¾ =
¡Ucc(C)C
Uc(C) denote the relative risk aversion with respect to labor
hours and consumption (evaluated at the steady state), and a lowercase variable denotes the
log-deviation of the corresponding level from its steady-state value. The log-linear version of
(29) is given by
n¤
t = c¤
t ¡ [Áamt + (1 ¡ Á)aft]: (31)






[Áamt + (1 ¡ Á)aft]: (32)
In what follows, we refer to c¤
t as the \natural rate" of output, since it is the equilibrium
real GDP without sticky-price distortions. Once the solution for consumption is obtained, we
can use a log-linearized version of the household's intertemporal Euler equation (8) to solve for













f;t+1 denote the (ex-ante) real interest rate. It follows from (32), (33), and the
shock processes (11) that
rr¤
t = Á½m¢amt + (1 ¡ Á)½f¢aft; (34)
where ¢akt = akt ¡ ak;t¡1 is the productivity growth rate in sector k 2 ff;mg.
3.3 The Sticky-Price Equilibrium
We now characterize the sticky-price equilibrium. We begin with de¯ning some notations.
Let ~ vkt = ln(Vkt=Pkt) ¡ ln(Vk=Pk) denote the log-deviation of sector k's real marginal cost
from steady state, for k 2 ff;mg, ~ qt = ln(Qt=Q) ¡ q¤
t denote the \relative-price gap," and
~ ct = ln(Ct=C) ¡ c¤
t denote the \output gap." The real marginal costs involve both the real
consumption wage and the relative price of the basket of intermediate goods. The real wage is
related to the output gap and aggregate employment through the labor supply equation. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that ! = 0 (corresponding to linear preferences in labor hours,
which can be justi¯ed by labor indivisibility). Under this assumption, it is straightforward to
show that the real marginal costs are related to the gaps by
~ vft = Á~ qt + (1 ¡ Á)¾~ ct; ~ vmt = ¾~ ct ¡ ~ qt: (35)
Next, we log-linearize the optimal pricing decision rules (16) and (17) around a zero-in°ation
steady state and make use of the log-linearized relations between the price indices and pricing
decisions in both sectors to get
¼ft = ¯Et¼f;t+1 + ·f(Á~ qt + (1 ¡ Á)¾~ ct); (36)
¼mt = ¯Et¼m;t+1 + ·m(¾~ ct ¡ ~ qt); (37)
13where ·k = (1 ¡ ¯®k)(1 ¡ ®k)=®k for k 2 ff;mg.
Then, by log-linearizing the intertemporal Euler equation (8) around steady state and
subtract the °exible-price counterpart (33) from the resulting equation, we can obtain an
Euler equation in terms of the gaps:
~ ct = Et~ ct+1 ¡ ¾¡1(rt ¡ Et¼f;t+1 ¡ rr¤
t); (38)
where rt and ¼ft are the log-deviations of the nominal interest rate and the CPI in°ation rate
from steady state and rr¤
t is the real interest rate in the °exible-price equilibrium given by
(34).
Finally, the law of motion of the relative price gap is given by





t¡1 and, by log-linearizing (28) around steady state, it is given by
¢q¤
t = (1 ¡ Á)(¢aft ¡ ¢amt): (40)
Clearly, if the shocks are identical across the two sectors (i.e., ¢aft = ¢amt), or if intermediate
goods are the only input for the ¯nished good sector (i.e., Á = 1), then the relative price in
the °exible-price equilibrium does not respond to the shocks.
For any given monetary policy, equations (36)-(39) fully characterize the equilibrium dy-
namics under sticky prices.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
We now turn to examining the issue of optimal monetary policy. In the model, there are
two sources of ine±ciencies. One comes from monopolistic competition, under which there
is a steady state markup distortion; and the other comes from staggered price-setting, with
which dynamic equilibrium °uctuations are possibly ine±cient. Our purpose is to analyze the
stabilizing properties of monetary policy rules in the dynamic equilibrium. Thus, without loss
of generality, we assume that the production subsidies exactly o®set the steady-state markup
distortions, so that the only possible source of ine±ciency would be staggered price setting
and that, if prices were allowed to adjust instantaneously, the equilibrium allocation would be
Pareto optimal. Under this assumption, an equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal only if the
relative price gap and output gap are both zero. A natural question then arises:
144.1 Can Monetary Policy Attain the First-Best Allocation?
The answer to this question is negative for general parameter values and shock processes. The
following proposition formally establishes this result.
Proposition 1. In the baseline model with sticky prices in both sectors and with labor being
used in the production of both intermediate goods and ¯nished goods (i.e., with 0 < Á < 1),
there exists no monetary policy that can attain the Pareto optimal allocation unless the two
sectors are bu®eted by identical shocks.
Proof: Suppose there were a monetary policy under which the equilibrium allocation under
sticky prices would be Pareto optimal. Then, in such an equilibrium, the gaps would be
completely closed for every period. That is, ~ ct = ~ qt = 0 for all t. It follows from (36) and
(37) that ¼ft = ¼mt = 0 for all t. Since we also have ¢~ qt = 0, (39) and (40) imply that
¼mt ¡ ¼ft = (1 ¡ Á)(¢aft ¡ ¢amt), contradicting that ¼ft = ¼mt = 0 unless ¢aft = ¢amt for
all t.
Q.E.D.
Note that, if Á = 1, that is, when no labor is required in producing ¯nal goods, then there
is no policy tradeo® and the Pareto optimal allocation is attainable regardless of the source
of shocks, despite the presence of the two sources of nominal rigidities. This result stands in
contrast to the conventional view that, in a two-sector model, the ¯rst-best allocation cannot
be achieved if the prices in both sectors are sticky [e.g., Erceg, et al. (2000) and Woodford
(2003a)]. A key di®erence of our model from the standard two-sector models in the literature
is the input-output connections between the sectors. As the share of intermediate input Á
takes an extreme value of one, the relative price in the e±cient equilibrium would not respond
to the shocks.
But in general, if Á 2 (0;1), the ¯rst-best allocation cannot be attained.5 The main reason
is that, in the e±cient equilibrium, both output and the relative price of intermediate goods
to ¯nal goods °uctuate in response to productivity shocks unless the two shocks are identical,
in which case only output would °uctuate. The °uctuations in output and in the relative price
in the e±cient equilibrium create a trade-o® facing the monetary authority: it can stabilize
either the output gap or the relative price gap, but not both. Since °uctuations in the relative
price in the sticky-price equilibrium have an allocative role, Pareto optimal allocation is not
attainable.
5In the extreme case with Á = 0, one sector would be shut o®, and the model would reduce to a standard
one-sector model.
15This result stands in contrast to that obtained in a standard one-sector model, which
predicts that the Pareto optimal allocation can be attained by complete stabilization of CPI
in°ation, since it also leads to complete stabilization of the output gap [e.g., Clarida, et al.
(1999), Goodfriend and King (2001), and Woodford (2003a)]. In the one-sector models, how-
ever, a tradeo® between stabilizing output gap and in°ation can arise if an ad-hoc \cost-push
shock" is introduced in the Phillips-curve relation [e.g., Clarida, et al., 1999]. In our model,
there is no ad-hoc cost-push shocks. Yet, a \cost-push" term arises endogenously in the ¯n-
ished good sector's Phillips-curve relation (36). To see this, we rewrite the real marginal cost
in the ¯nished good sector in (35) to obtain ~ vft = ¾~ ct¡Á~ vmt, where the ¯rst term is the output
gap, just as in the one-sector model, and the second term corresponds to a cost-push \shock,"
which is here determined by the real marginal cost in the intermediate good sector. As we will
show below, the real marginal cost in the intermediate good sector plays an important role in
the objective function that a benevolent central bank tries to minimize.
4.2 A Utility-Based Objective Function for Optimal Monetary Policy
Given that the Pareto optimal allocation is in general not attainable, a natural question arises:
What is a second-best monetary policy? To answer this question requires a well-de¯ned welfare
criterion or an objective function for the central bank. We now formally derive such an objective
function based on the representative household's utility function.
By replacing the event argument with a time subscript, we can rewrite the household's




¯tUt; where Ut = U(Ct) ¡ V (Nt): (41)










+ t:i:p: + O(kak3); (42)
where ct denotes the log-deviation of consumption (in the sticky-price equilibrium) from steady
state, t:i:p: refers to the terms independent of policy, and O(kak3) summarizes all terms of
the third or higher orders. Since the output gap is de¯ned as ~ ct = ct ¡ c¤
t, the period utility







t + (1 ¡ ¾)c¤
t~ ct
¶
+ t:i:p: + O(kak3); (43)
where c¤
t denotes the log-deviation of consumption in the °exible-price equilibrium from steady
state.
16We next approximate the period disutility function of working, which, after imposing the
labor market clearing conditions (20), is given by V (Nt) = V (Nft + Nmt). Taking a second-
order approximation around steady state leads to
V (Nt) = Vn(N)N
½







+ t:i:p: + O(kak3); (44)
where we have used the steady state ratios Nf=N = 1¡Á and Nm=N = Á, and we have also set
the relative risk aversion parameter ! = VnnN=Vn to zero to simplify expressions. To express
V (Nt) in terms of the gaps, we use the de¯nitions ~ nft = nft ¡n¤
ft and ~ nmt = nmt ¡n¤
mt, along




V (Nt) = Vn(N)N
n
(1 ¡ Á)~ nft + Á~ nmt + 1
2[(1 ¡ Á)~ n2
ft + Á~ n2
mt] + n¤
t[(1 ¡ Á)~ nft + Á~ nmt]
o
+t:i:p: + O(kak3): (45)
We now use the labor-demand equations (14) and (19) and their °exible-price counterparts
to express the sectoral employment gaps in terms of the output gap and the relative price gap,
and obtain
~ nft = Á~ qt + (1 ¡ Á¾)~ ct + ln(Gft); (46)
~ nmt = ¡(1 ¡ Á)~ qt + (1 + (1 ¡ Á)¾)~ ct + ln(Gft) + ln(Gmt); (47)
where we have imposed the unit cost functions in (15) and (18), and the variable Gkt ´
R 1
0 (Pkt(i)=Pkt)¡µkdi measures the price-dispersions caused by staggered price setting in sector










kt + O(kak3); k 2 ff;mg: (48)
Substituting equations (46), (47), and (48) into (45) and using the steady-state relation
Uc(C)C = Vn(N)N, we get














t ¡ ¾Á(1 ¡ Á)~ ct~ qt + n¤
t~ ct
o
+t:i:p: + O(kak3): (49)
Finally, since (30) and (31) imply that (1 ¡ ¾)c¤
t = n¤
t, by subtracting V (Nt) in (49) from










+ t:i:p: + O(kak3): (50)
Note that the second term on the right-hand side of the equation involves the gap of the real
marginal cost in the intermediate good sector. Thus, given that Uc(C) > 0, the °uctuations
17in the output gap and in the marginal-cost gap, as well as the dispersion of prices, tend to
lower welfare. Following a similar procedure described in Woodford (2003a), we can relate the









kt + t:i:p: + O(kak3); k 2 ff;mg; (51)
where ·k = (1 ¡ ¯®k)(1 ¡ ®k)=®k measures the responsiveness of the in°ation rate in sector
k to changes in the real marginal cost, as shown in the Phillips-curve relations (36) and (37).










¯tLt + t:i:p: + O(kak3); (52)
where W measures the welfare and the quadratic loss function is given by
Lt = ¾~ c2





The loss function (53) reveals that the benevolent central bank should care about not only
°uctuations in the output gap and CPI in°ation, as a one-sector model would suggest, but
also the variability of the marginal-cost gap in the intermediate good sector and PPI in°ation.
In a standard one-sector model, however, the central bank's loss function consists of only the
variances of CPI in°ation and the output gap, and the relative weights assigned to the two
components are irrelevant for the determination of optimal monetary policy. In such a model,
the monetary authority faces no tradeo® in stabilizing the output gap and CPI in°ation, since
keeping the CPI in°ation rate constant would also minimize the variability in the output gap.
In fact, the ¯rst-best welfare levels can be obtained in this class of models by following a
remarkably simple policy of extreme CPI in°ation-targeting.
In our model, the benevolent central bank's loss function also involves two additional terms:
variations in PPI in°ation and the gap of the real marginal cost in the production of interme-
diate goods. The variability of the real marginal cost gap is present as a separate term in the
loss function and cannot possibly be rewritten as a combination of the other three terms in the
loss function, because °uctuations in the sectoral relative price have an allocative role. This
stands in contrast to the two-sector model such as that in Aoki (2001), where there is a single
source of nominal rigidity, so that °uctuations in the relative price have no allocative role, and
the ¯rst-best allocation is attainable. Here, to achieve Pareto optimal allocation would require
not only complete stabilization of the output gap and CPI in°ation rate but also complete
stabilization of the PPI in°ation rate and the marginal-cost gap, and thus the relative-price
gap. Hence, as we have already shown in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, it is impossible for
18monetary policy to attain the Pareto optimal allocation except in the special cases where the
two sectors are bu®eted by identical productivity shocks, or the prices of intermediate goods
or ¯nished goods are °exible, or the processing of the ¯nished goods does not require the use of
primary factors. In the latter two cases, °uctuations in the relative price play no allocative role.
In general, the central bank faces tradeo®s in stabilizing the four components in its optimally
derived objective function: the output gap, CPI in°ation, PPI in°ation, and the marginal-cost
gap. Since the ¯rst-best allocation is in general not attainable, the optimality of a monetary
policy depends on the relative weights assigned to the four components that the central bank
should care about in its objective function.
The presence of nominal rigidities in both the ¯nished good sector and the intermediate
good sector renders the variability of CPI in°ation and PPI in°ation both important (in
addition to the gaps) in the central bank's welfare objective. This result bears some similarity
to that obtained in a model with sticky prices and sticky nominal wages, such as Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Amato and Laubach (2003), where the objective function
contains the variability of consumer price in°ation and nominal wage in°ation (along with the
output gap). The main di®erence lies in the presence of the variability of the marginal cost
gap here that does not have a counterpart in the model with sticky price and sticky wages.6
This di®erence arises from treating intermediates, rather than labor as in Erceg, et al. (2000),
as the input subject to nominal rigidity.7
Our emphasis on the nominal rigidities in both the intermediate good sector and the ¯nished
good sector also bears some apparent similarity to an open economy model where imported
goods are treated as intermediate inputs in the production of ¯nal consumption goods, such
as the ones in McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Smets and Wouters (2002). In this class of
models, as discussed in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and Nelson (2002), if the ¯nal good
prices are sticky, then the variability of CPI in°ation (rather than domestic price in°ation)
enters the welfare objective for a central bank, as in our current model. Despite this similarity,
it is hard to draw a precise isomorphism between our model and an open economy model
like this, for two reasons. First, the PPI in°ation rate that enters the welfare objective in
our model does not have a clear counterpart in an open economy setup. Our derivations of
6As we have discussed in Section 3, even in the special case with Á = 1, when the marginal cost gap drops
out of the objective function, the implications of the two types of models on optimal monetary policy still di®er:
with Á = 1, the policy tradeo® disappears and the ¯rst-best allocation is attainable in our model, but there is
always a tradeo® between stabilizing price in°ation, wage in°ation, and output gap in the model with sticky
prices and sticky wages.
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this last point.
19the objective function reveal that the variability of PPI in°ation enters the welfare objective
through the demand for labor input by the intermediate good sector (i.e., the ln(Gmt) term in
equation (47)). In an open economy, to the extent that factors are immobile across countries
and national central banks make independent monetary policies, the variability of imported
intermediate good prices does not independently a®ect, on top of the presence of CPI in°ation,
the home country's welfare even if import prices are sticky. This di®erence arises mainly
because the production of intermediate goods in our model requires labor as an input, while
the production of (imported) intermediate goods in an open economy model does not require
domestic labor input so that the variability of the prices of imported intermediate goods does
not a®ect domestic welfare.8 Second, the marginal cost gap that enters the welfare objective
in our model has no counterpart in an open economy model.
In light of (53), the weights assigned to the output gap and CPI in°ation in the central
bank's objective function in our model are similar to those obtained in a standard one-sector
model where the policymaker's loss function features only these two components. The optimal
weights assigned to PPI in°ation and the marginal-cost gap are uniquely derived from our
model, and they depend on the share of intermediate input in the production of ¯nished goods
(i.e., the parameter Á). In the loss function Lt in (53), the weight on PPI in°ation increases
with Á while the weight on the marginal-cost gap is a concave function of Á and achieves its
maximum at Á = 0:5. Therefore, a greater value of Á leads the central bank to care more
about the variability in PPI in°ation, while a more moderate value of Á (close to 0:5) would
justify a greater concern about variations in the marginal-cost gap.
The role played by Á in shaping the policymaker's objective function is a unique feature of
our model with a chain-like input-output structure. If Á falls below 0:5, the intermediate input
becomes a less important factor in the production of the ¯nal consumption goods, and the
central bank becomes less concerned about variations in both PPI in°ation and the marginal
cost in the intermediate good sector. If Á rises above 0:5, the intermediate inputs become
more important, and the central bank becomes more concerned about variations in the PPI
in°ation. However, as PPI in°ation receives more direct attention, less attention needs to be
paid to the marginal cost, since variations in the former are attributable in part to variations
8In the two-sector model in Smets and Wouters (2002), one sector produces domestic ¯nal goods and the
other processes imported intermediate goods before they enter the ¯nal consumption basket, and the prices
in both sectors are sticky. The welfare objective function thus contains a weighted average of domestic price
in°ation and the in°ation rate of ¯nished imported goods, with the weights depending on the degree of openness
to trade. The weighted average of the two sectors' in°ation rates, in our view, corresponds more closely to a
CPI in°ation rate in a broad sense than to a parallel of our CPI in°ation and PPI in°ation.
20in the latter. This implication of the input-output structure on the central bank's objective
function has signi¯cant consequences on the determination of the optimal monetary policy
rule, as we demonstrate below.
5 Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy
To implement optimal monetary policy requires the central bank to possess perfect informa-
tion about the leads and lags of the in°ation rates and the gaps, which is a di±cult task.
Nonetheless, we can compute the model's implied welfare level under optimal monetary policy
with calibrated parameters and use this welfare level as a natural benchmark to evaluate the
performance of alternative feedback interest rate rules that are feasible to implement based
on the information set that the policymakers do possess. We now present our main results
based on numerical simulations. The optimal policy is obtained by maximizing the welfare
level de¯ned in (52) and (53), subject to the equilibrium conditions (36)-(39).
5.1 The Calibration of Parameters
We begin with calibration of the model's parameters. The calibrated values are summarized in
Table 2. Balanced growth requires the relative risk aversion in consumption to be unity, and
thus we set ¾ = 1. Following the lead of Hansen (1985), we assume that labor is indivisible,
implying that the representative agent's utility is linear in labor hours so that ! = 0. The
subjective discount factor is set to ¯ = 0:99. Thus, with a period in the model corresponding
to a quarter, the annual real interest rate in the steady state is 4 percent. The empirical
evidence surveyed by Taylor (1999) suggests that nominal price contracts on average last for
a year. We thus set ®f = 0:75 and ®m = 0:75 so that the duration of the nominal contracts
in the model is on average four quarters. The parameters µf and µm measure the elasticity of
substitution between di®erentiated goods at the two processing stages. We set both parameters
to 10, corresponding to a steady-state markup of 11 percent, which is consistent with empirical
evidence. We assume that the production functions in the two sectors exhibit constant returns
to scale. Following the literature, we set the cost-share of intermediate input in ¯nal goods
production to Á = 0:6 (see Huang, Liu and Phaneuf (2004) for details in the calibration of Á).
Finally, we follow the standard business cycle literature and set the AR(1) coe±cient ½k in the
productivity growth process in sector k 2 ff;mg to be 0:95, and the standard deviations of
the innovations to productivity shocks ¾k to be 0:02.
215.2 Intermediate-Input Share and Optimal Monetary Policy
In the central bank's objective function, we have seen that the share of intermediate input in
the ¯nished good sector determines how much policymakers should care about PPI in°ation
and the marginal cost gap, and therefore it is potentially important in determining the welfare
levels of alternative policy rules if this objective function is used to evaluate the performance of
these policies. We have noted that, although the optimal weights assigned to the variances of
CPI in°ation and the output gap do not depend on Á, the weight assigned to the variability of
PPI in°ation is increasing in Á while the weight on the marginal-cost gap in the intermediate
good sector is a concave function of Á, with an interior peak. The welfare levels will thus be
sensitive to the values of Á. We now examine the quantitative implications of Á on the levels
of welfare under the optimal monetary policy.
The welfare measure W de¯ned in (52) is in terms of the utility. The welfare loss measured
as a percentage of steady-state consumption can be obtained by dividing the utility level W
by Uc(C)C (and multiplied by 100). This is the quantitative measure that we use for our
experiments. Figure 1 plots the sensitivity of welfare loss to changes in Á. The solid line
denotes the welfare loss under the optimal monetary policy. For small values of Á, the ¯gure
shows that the loss is small; as Á rises from zero to a moderate level, the loss increases and
reaches a peak at Á = 0:3; as Á further rises, the welfare loss falls. We consider the range
between 0:5 and 0:8 to be a plausible range for the values of Á. Then the welfare loss lies
between 0:05 and 0:25 percent of steady-state consumption. Thus, depending on the share of
intermediate inputs in the ¯nal good sector, the tradeo® between the two measures of in°ation
and the gaps can potentially incur signi¯cant welfare losses.
Yet, our main concern is not about how much welfare loss would be incurred under the
optimal monetary policy. A more interesting question is how to implement the second-best
policy. In light of the central bank's objective function given by (52) and (53), it is di±cult
to implement the optimal monetary policy, since it would require the central bank to possess
knowledge about the leads and lags of the in°ation rates and the gaps. Nonetheless, we can
use the welfare level under the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark to evaluate alternative
simple monetary policy rules that are easier to implement.
5.3 Evaluating Simple Feedback Interest Rate Rules
Simple feedback interest rate rules are often viewed as e®ective tools to conduct monetary
policy. A particularly simple policy rule is the Taylor rule, under which the central bank
22sets the short-term nominal interest rate in response to °uctuations in CPI in°ation and the
output gap. Since the Taylor rule ignores other important variables in the objective function,
especially the PPI in°ation rate, it would be interesting to see how much more welfare loss
would be incurred under a Taylor rule than that under the optimal policy. Figure 1 shows
that the welfare loss under the optimal Taylor rule (with the reaction coe±cients in front of
the targeting variables optimally chosen) is signi¯cantly larger than that under the optimal
policy.9 Under the calibrated parameters with Á = 0:6, the optimal Taylor rule incurs a welfare
loss of 0:3 percent of consumption, which is about 1:6 times the loss under the optimal policy.
We now investigate whether a simple interest rate rule that includes both CPI in°ation and
PPI in°ation can perform better under the calibrated parameters. Table 3 displays the welfare
losses under a set of interest rate rules that allow the short-term rate to respond to, in addition
to its own lag, various combinations of °uctuations in CPI in°ation, PPI in°ation, and the
output gap. The losses are expressed as ratios of the actual welfare losses to that under the
optimal monetary policy. Evidently, an interest rate rule that targets both CPI in°ation and
PPI in°ation (TR4 in the table) outperforms any rule that excludes either in°ation measure
(TR2, TR3, TR5, or TR6). Adding the output gap as an additional targeting variable (TR1)
does not visibly a®ect the welfare results.
Since both CPI in°ation and PPI in°ation are readily available in the data, and setting
the short-term interest rate to respond to changes in these two measures of in°ation brings the
welfare level not far from the second-best, an immediate policy implication is that the central
bank should be able to construct an \optimal in°ation index" that is a weighted average of
CPI and PPI in°ation, and it can then follow a \modi¯ed Taylor rule" that replaces the CPI
in°ation with the optimal in°ation index. Figure 2 shows that, in such an optimal in°ation
index, the weight on PPI in°ation increases with the share of intermediate input; and for all
plausible values of Á, the PPI weight is between 0:4 and 0:5, far from being negligible. Under
calibrated parameters with Á = 0:6, the PPI weight is about 0:46 (see also Table 3). We argue
that such a policy rule is as easy to implement as the traditional Taylor rule, and it also brings
the welfare level much closer to that under the optimal monetary policy than does the simple
Taylor rule or any other rule that excludes PPI in°ation as a targeting variable.
9We have also included the lagged nominal interest rate in the Taylor rule so as to smooth interest rate
°uctuations and to avoid hitting the zero lower bound [for a recent study of the desirability of interest-rate
smoothing policies, see, for example, Woodford (1999, 2003b)].
236 Optimal Interest Rate Rules Under Possible Central Bank
Misperception
We have thus far assumed that, in formulating monetary policy, the central bank observes
the actual sources of shocks and pays respect to the nominal rigidities in both sectors. It is
reasonable, however, to consider situations where the central bank may not know the true
sources of shocks or of nominal rigidities. A natural question is then: How much welfare loss
would be incurred if the central bank formulates its policy under possible misperceptions of
the shocks or the nominal rigidities?
To answer this question, we follow two steps of computation. For instance, in the case with
possible misperceptions of shocks, we ¯rst let the central bank simulate the baseline model to
¯nd the optimal reaction coe±cients in the baseline interest rate rule (i.e., TR1) conditional on
its belief about the source of shocks; we then turn on the actual shocks (which may not coincide
with the central bank's belief) and compute the welfare loss under the pseudo-optimal interest
rate rule. In these experiments, we consider three possible sources of shocks: the shocks may hit
just the CPI sector, the PPI sector, or both. Similarly, in the case with possible misperception
of the source of nominal rigidities, we allow the central bank to formulate a pseudo-optimal
interest rate rule conditional on its belief about the price stickiness in each sector, and then
compute the welfare loss under such a policy in the baseline economy with sticky prices in
both sectors. This latter case is of particular interest because many commentators make their
monetary policy proposals based on a one-sector model with a single source of nominal rigidity.
Table 4 presents the welfare losses under the central bank's misperceptions about shocks
or nominal rigidities. The welfare loss is normalized to unity if the central bank's belief turns
out to be correct. The table shows that, regardless of the true sources of shocks, the central
bank can avoid most of the welfare losses due to misperception if it assumes that the shocks
hit either the PPI sector alone (e.g., oil shocks) or both sectors. On the other hand, if the
central bank incorrectly believes that the shocks hit just the CPI sector, the potential losses
would be much greater. The table also shows that, if the actual economy features sticky prices
in both sectors, then formulating monetary policy based on the incorrect belief that there is
only a single source of nominal rigidity would incur substantial welfare losses, and this is true
regardless of the sources of shocks.
247 Other Policy Objectives
We have thus far characterized optimal monetary policy, with the objective function facing the
central bank being derived from the ¯rst principle. In the literature, other policy objectives
have also been considered, especially the variance of the output gap [e.g., Mankiw and Reis
(2002)]. We now examine the implications of introducing the input-output connections on the
optimal monetary policy design if the central bank is mainly concerned about the variance of
the output gap.
7.1 Extreme In°ation-Targeting Policies
A common view is that the variations of the output gap can be reduced or even eliminated if the
monetary authority can achieve price level stability by eliminating °uctuations in CPI in°ation
[e.g., Goodfriend and King (2001)]. In a similar spirit, we now consider the stabilizing e®ects
of two policies: one sets ¼ft = 0 and the other sets ¼mt = 0 for all t. We call the ¯rst policy
an \extreme CPI-in°ation targeting regime" and the second policy an \extreme PPI-in°ation
targeting regime."
Under each policy regime, we use the equilibrium conditions (36)-(39) to compute the
variance of the output gap. For convenience, we rewrite the equilibrium conditions here:10
¼ft = ¯Et¼f;t+1 + ·f(Á~ qt + (1 ¡ Á)¾~ ct); (54)
¼mt = ¯Et¼m;t+1 + ·m(¾~ ct ¡ ~ qt); (55)
~ qt = ~ qt¡1 + ¼mt ¡ ¼ft ¡ ¢q¤
t; (56)
where the term ¢q¤
t is the relative price of intermediate goods in the °exible price equilibrium
and is given by ¢q¤
t = (1 ¡ Á)(¢aft ¡ ¢amt). Denote et = ¢aft ¡ ¢amt. For analytical
convenience, we assume that ½f = ½m = ½ so that
et = ½et¡1 + "t; (57)
where "t = "ft ¡"mt. The distribution assumption about the shocks in the two sectors implies




Under the extreme CPI-in°ation targeting regime with ¼ft = 0, equation (54) implies that
Á~ qt = (Á ¡ 1)¾~ ct. Using this relation, along with (55) and (56), we can eliminate ~ qt and ¼mt
10The intertemporal Euler equation (38) is omitted here, since it serves only to pin down the equilibrium
nominal interest rate once the output gap and the in°ation rates are solved out.
25and obtain a second-order di®erence equation in ~ ct:
¯Et~ ct+1 ¡
µ




~ ct + ~ ct¡1 =
Á
(1 ¡ Á)¾
(¯Etet+1 ¡ et): (58)
The solution is a second-order autoregressive process (i.e, an AR(2) process) given by
~ cft = (½ + ¸f)~ cf;t¡1 ¡ ½¸f~ cf;t¡2 + ´f"t; (59)
where ~ cft denotes the solution of the output gap under the extreme CPI-in°ation targeting
regime, ¸f is the root of the quadratic polynomial ¯¸2 ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·m=(1 ¡ Á))¸ + 1 = 0 that
lies within the unit circle, and ´f =
¸fÁ(1¡¯½)
¾(1¡¯½¸f). Since ´f > 0, a shock with "t > 0, that is,
with "ft > "mt, would result in an increase in the output gap. In other words, if the ¯nished
good sector's productivity shock dominates, then, under the extreme CPI-in°ation targeting
regime, the output gap rises; if the intermediate good sector's shock dominates, then the gap
falls.
Similarly, the solution of the output gap dynamics under the extreme PPI-in°ation target-
ing regime is an AR(2) process given by
~ cmt = (½ + ¸m)~ cm;t¡1 ¡ ½¸m~ cm;t¡2 + ´m"t; (60)
where ~ cmt denotes the output gap under the extreme PPI-in°ation targeting regime, ¸m is
the root of the quadratic polynomial ¯¸2 ¡ (1 + ¯ + ·f)¸ + 1 = 0 that lies within the unit
circle, and ´m = ¡
¸m(1¡Á)(1¡¯½)
¾(1¡¯½¸m) . Since ´m < 0, a dominant productivity shock in the ¯nished
good sector would result in a fall in the output gap under the extreme PPI-in°ation targeting
regime.
The policy objective we consider here is to minimize the variance of the output gap. We now
compare the implied variance of the gap under the two alternative policy regimes. Following





(1 ¡ ¸j½)[(1 + ¸j½)2 ¡ (½ + ¸j)2]
; j 2 ff;mg; (61)
where ¡f = Var(~ cft) and ¡m = Var(~ cmt) denote the variance of the output gap under each of
the two policy regimes.
To see the dependence of the variances of the gap under the two policies on the input-
output connections, we plot in Figure 3 the variance of the gap as a function of the parameter
Á 2 [0;1] under each of the two policy regimes, with the rest of the parameters calibrated to
their baseline values (see Table 2). The ¯gure shows that the extreme CPI-in°ation targeting
26policy is more e®ective in stabilizing the °uctuations of the output gap than the extreme PPI-
in°ation targeting policy. With high values of Á, however, the two extreme in°ation-targeting
policies yield similar volatility of the output gap. If one believes that the primary objective of
the central bank should be to stabilize output gap °uctuations, then a policy that maintains
consumer price stability seems to be reasonably e®ective, although for large, yet plausible,
values of the share of intermediate inputs, a policy that maintains producer price stability
does almost equally well in achieving output stability.
7.2 Optimal Stabilizing In°ation-Targeting Policies
In principle, to achieve the goal of stabilizing output gap °uctuations, the monetary authority
does not have to resort to the extreme in°ation targeting policies described above. In other
words, these rigid extreme policies need not be optimal in the sense of minimizing the variance
of the gap. We now characterize the optimal monetary policy that achieves the goal of stabi-
lization and discuss the implementation of the optimal policy through simple feedback interest
rate rules.






subject to the equilibrium conditions (36) - (39), where ­ is a constant. The solution yields a
constant output gap under the optimal stabilizing policy, that is, ~ ct = 0.
Thus, while strict targeting of either CPI in°ation or PPI in°ation cannot achieve the goal
of output-gap stabilization, a policy that targets a mixture of the two measures of in°ation
rates can eliminate °uctuations in the output gap. The optimal stabilization in°ation index
obtained here is a weighted average of CPI and PPI in°ation rates, with the weights depending
on the share of intermediate inputs. In this sense, our results extend those in Mankiw and
Reis (2002) to a model with input-output connections.
8 In°ation Accounting: Some Evidence
Our model suggests that, in the presence of two sources of nominal rigidities and the input-
output connections between stages of production, a benevolent central bank should take into
account variations in both CPI in°ation and PPI in°ation when conducting monetary policy:
both in°ation rates appear as a policy goal in the central bank's objective function and as a
policy instrument that implements optimal monetary policy. The optimal in°ation index is a
27weighted average of CPI and PPI in°ation rates, both for the goal of maximizing social welfare
and of stabilizing °uctuations in the output gap.
The policy implications of our model contrast those obtained in a standard model with
a single source of nominal rigidity, which has been a popular model that guides much of the
monetary policy discussion. A natural question is then: Does empirical evidence support the
implications of our two-sector model with the kind of input-output connections elaborated in
Section 2?
To answer this question, we need to examine empirically the importance of the input-
output connections (i.e., the role of Á) and of the additional nominal rigidity that we introduce
in the CPI sector (i.e, the role of ®f), which are two important features of our model. In the
absence of either feature, one source of nominal rigidity would be shut o®, and our model's
equilibrium dynamics would reduce to those in a standard model [e.g., Aoki (2001)]. In such
an extreme case, there would be no markup variations in the CPI sector. Thus, one way to test
the empirical validity of our baseline model against a standard model is to examine whether
there are important markup variations in the CPI sector.
To implement such a test, we use the model's implied relation between CPI in°ation, PPI
in°ation, and nominal wage in°ation.11 In particular, our model implies that the consumer
price should be a markup over the CPI sector's marginal cost, which is a weighted average of
the producer price and nominal wages, as in (15). It follows that the in°ation measures are
related through
¼ft = Á¼mt + (1 ¡ Á)¼wt + ut; (63)
where ¼wt denotes the nominal wage in°ation and ut is a residual that includes exogenous
shocks to the CPI sector and (potentially) endogenous variations in the markup as well.
We begin by examining how much of the variations in CPI in°ation can be accounted
for by the composite of PPI in°ation and wage in°ation on the right-hand side of (63). The
composite corresponds to the marginal cost ^ vft in the CPI sector. Using a calibrated value of
Á = 0:6 and quarterly in°ation data obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (with
a sample period 1983:Q1 - 2003:Q4), we obtain the following variance decomposition:
var(¼f) = var(^ vf) + var(u) + 2cov(^ vf;u);
1:179 = 0:663 + 0:525 ¡ 0:008: (64)
The fraction of the variance of CPI in°ation accounted for by the residual ut is about 0:44
(i.e., 0:525=1:179), implying important variations in the \in°ation residual."
11We are grateful to Bob King for suggesting that we pursue this line.
28Since the in°ation residual contains information about both exogenous shocks to the CPI
sector and endogenous variations in the markup, the size of its variance, by itself, does not
necessarily imply that there are important markup variations. Yet, if the residual contains only
information about shocks, then it should be exogenous. We thus conduct a bi-variate test of
the hypothesis that the in°ation residual is not Granger-caused by several alternative variables.
The variables we use include real GDP, three-month Treasury bill rates, and a yield spread
(the di®erence between 10-year Treasury constant maturity rates and 3-month T-bill rates),
all at quarterly frequency. To isolate °uctuations at the business cycle frequency (between six
quarters and eight years), we apply the band-pass ¯lter proposed by Baxter and King (1995)
to each variable, based on a 12-quarter centered moving average (the band-pass ¯lter thus
reduces the sample size by 24 quarters).12 Table 5 presents the Granger causality test results.
The null hypothesis that the in°ation residual is not Granger-caused by any of these variables
is rejected, with a P-value of less than 0:001 in each case, and the rejection does not depend
on the number of lags used in the regressions.
From the in°ation accounting exercise, we conclude that there are important variations
in the in°ation residual, which cannot be completely attributable to exogenous shocks. Our
baseline model that features input-output connections between the CPI sector and the PPI
sector and nominal rigidities in both sectors provides a plausible interpretation of this empirical
¯nding, whereas a standard model with a single source of nominal rigidities or a multi-sector
model with no input-output connections does not.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a framework to evaluate in°ation-targeting monetary policy rules. In the
model, production of ¯nal consumption goods needs to go through two stages of processing,
with two sectors interconnected through a vertical chain of production, so that a natural dis-
tinction between CPI and PPI arises from the model. We have established a utility-based
welfare criterion for a benevolent central bank, so as to provide a useful benchmark for evalu-
ating the performance of alternative monetary policy rules.
The welfare criterion makes it explicit that the central bank should care about not only the
variability of CPI in°ation and the output gap (as a standard one-sector model would suggest)
12As argued by Gali, et al. (2002), the nominal interest rate and the yield spread \can be thought of as a
rough measure of the stance of monetary policy, while detrended GDP is just a simple cyclical indicator." Our
results do not hinge upon the choice of these variables.
29but also the variability of PPI in°ation and the real marginal cost in the production of interme-
diate goods. With the input-output connections, a \cost-push" term arises endogenously in the
Phillips-curve equation derived from the optimal pricing decisions of the ¯nal good producers,
and this term is determined by the same real marginal cost that enters the policy objective.
The real marginal cost gap is present in the policy objective since, in our model, °uctuations
in the relative price of intermediate goods to ¯nal goods have an allocative role. The presence
of the endogenous \cost-push" term introduces a tradeo® between the in°ation rates and the
gaps so that the ¯rst-best allocation is not attainable.
With the second-best welfare level as a benchmark, we have evaluated alternative simple
interest rate rules. We ¯nd that rules that exclude PPI in°ation as a targeting variable would
typically incur signi¯cant welfare losses, while rules that include an optimal in°ation index,
that is, a weighted average of CPI in°ation and PPI in°ation, would typically bring the welfare
level close to the second-best. The weight assigned to PPI in°ation in the optimal in°ation
index depends on the share of intermediate goods and is in general non-negligible.
We have further strengthened our case that the central bank should pay respect to nominal
rigidities in both the CPI sector and the PPI sector by pointing out that, if the central bank
formulates its optimal policy by ignoring the nominal rigidity in any sector, the welfare loss
would be large, and this is true regardless of the sources of shocks. When the central bank
does not know the actual sources of shocks, we show that it can avoid much of the welfare
loss by assuming that the shocks hit both sectors (or the PPI sector alone) and formulate its
optimal policy based on this assumption.
To help derive analytical results and to simplify exposition, we have focused on nominal
rigidities in the PPI sector and the CPI sector. We do not claim that these are the only sources
of nominal rigidities in the actual economy. Clearly, they are not. A more ambitious model
should probably take into account, in addition to these price rigidities, some other sources of
nominal or real imperfections, such as nominal wage rigidities. Our analytical results suggest
that introducing nominal wage rigidities would unlikely change the main conclusion: because
of the presence of sticky prices in both the CPI and the PPI sectors, °uctuations in the
sectoral relative price play an important allocative role, even with sticky wages introduced,
so that optimal policy should not ignore either in°ation rate. In light of the inattention to
PPI in°ation in both policy practice and academic research, it seems compelling that better
understanding of the input-output connections and of the cyclical behavior of PPI in°ation
should be elevated to the top of research agenda.
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32Table 1.
In°ation-targeting around the world
Countries Year Adopted Target Variable
Australia 1993 CPI (after 1998)
Canada 1991 CPI (excl. food, energy and taxes)
Finland 1993 CPI (excl. taxes, housing, and interest)
Israel 1991 CPI
New Zealand 1988 CPI (excl. taxes and interest)
Spain 1994 CPI
Sweden 1993 CPI
UK 1992 Retail price index (excl. interest)
Source: Speech by Deputy Governor Murray Sherwin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand (1999);
Bernanke, et al. (1999); and Leiderman and Svensson (1995).
Table 2.
Calibrated parameter values
Preferences: U(C) ¡ V (N) ¾ = ¡UccC
Uc = 1, ! = VnnN
Vn = 0
Subjective discount factor: ¯ = 0:99
Nominal contract duration: ®f = 0:75, ®m = 0:75


















Finished good production: Yf(j) = ¹ Ym(j)Á(AfNf(j))1¡Á, Á 2 [0:5;0:8].
Intermediate good production: Ym(i) = AmNm(i)
Technology shock processes: ¢ln(Akt) = ½k¢ln(Ak;t¡1) + "kt, ½k = 0:95, ¾k = 0:02, k 2 ff;mg.
33Table 3.
Optimal interest rate rules
Optimal policy coe±cients
Policy Rules ¼ft ¼mt ~ ct rt¡1 CPI weight Welfare loss
TR1 1:68 1:42 0:04 1:12 0:54 1:09
TR2 1:75 0:55 0:82 1 1:64
TR3 2:71 0:62 1:85 0 1:99
TR4 1:68 1:42 1:12 0:54 1:09
TR5 2:06 0:89 1 1:67
TR6 3:18 2:58 0 2:09
Note: The interest rate rules are of the generic form rt = a1¼ft + a2¼mt + a3~ ct + a4rt¡1, with
the 6 interest rate rules (i.e., TR1 through TR6) each being a special case with appropriate
zero-restrictions on the a-coe±cients (corresponding to the blank spaces in the table). The ¯rst
four columns of numbers give the optimal a-coe±cients that minimize the welfare loss de¯ned
in the text; the ¯fth column contains the relative weight of CPI-in°ation in the optimal rules
[i.e., a1
a1+a2], and the last column gives the welfare loss under each interest rate rule relative to
that under the optimal monetary policy.
34Table 4.
Welfare losses when the central bank misperceives
the sources of shocks or of nominal rigidities
Perceived Shocks Perceived Rigidities
Actual PPI CPI both PPI CPI both
Shocks shock shock shocks rigidity rigidity rigidities
PPI shock 1 6:03 1:00 2:65 1:69 1
CPI shock 1:04 1 1:04 2:64 1:45 1
both shocks 1:00 3:58 1 1:40 1:11 1
Note: The welfare losses under misperceived shocks or nominal rigidities are relative to those
under correct perceptions. While we allow \actual" shocks to come from either the PPI sector
or the CPI sector (or both), we maintain that prices are sticky in both sectors in the baseline
economy.
Table 5.
Bi-Variate Granger Causality Test (1983:Q1 - 2003:Q4)
Variables Two Lags Four Lags
F-Stat P-Value Â2-Stat P-Value F-Stat P-Value Â2-Stat P-Value
Real GDP 9.57 0.001 20.89 0.001 5.48 0.001 25.79 0.001
T-Bill Rate 8.15 0.001 17.78 0.001 11.74 0.001 55.25 0.001
Yield Spread 10.34 0.001 22.55 0.001 9.69 0.001 45.59 0.001
Note: The P-values do not exceed the values reported in the table. Thus, in all cases, the
P-values are less than or equal to 0:001.


















































Figure 1:|Sensitivity of welfare losses to the share of intermediate input.






















































































































Figure 3:|The variance of output gap under extreme in°ation-targeting policies.
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